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Note
Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home
Ann R. Mesnikoff
Americans have a throw-away mentality. Americans throw
away 179.6 million tons of garbage per year.- People in this
country generate more garbage per capita than in any other nation.2 The ease with which we produce garbage is not matched
by an eagerness to create places to dispose of it. "[T]he First
Law of Garbage is: 'Everybody wants us to pick it up, and nobody wants us to put it down.' ,3 A severe shortage of disposal
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes garbage as:
"bottles, cans, disposable diapers, uneaten food, scraps of wood and metal,
worn-out tires and used-up batteries, paper and plastic packages, boxes, broken furniture and appliances, clippings from our lawns and shrubs-the varied
human refuse of our modem industrial society." OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE,
UNITED STATES ENvIRON ENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID WATE DI
LEMM: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 6 (1989) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR ACTION].

Garbage is only part of what is more technically referred to as solid waste,
which according to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, ineludes "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material."
42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1988).
See Don Phillips, Garbage on the Rails: Out of Sight Out of Mind ContainersMask Cargo as Trains Roll Past D.C., WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al
(reporting EPA estimate). The EPA estimates that the amount of garbage
Americans generate will reach 216 million tons by the year 2000. Id
2. Margaret E. Kriz, The Big Stink, NAT'L J., Oct. 19, 1991, at 2540 (quoting Sen. Max Baucus, chairman of the Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Environmental Protection); see also AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra
note 1, at 12 (comparing amount of waste Americans generate per person with
that in West Germany).
3. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 8. NIMBY, the acronym for
"Not In My Backyard," is commonly associated with opposition to the siting of
new waste disposal facilities of any kind-landfill, combustor, or recycling centers. See ici; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NExT FOR MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE? 1 (1989) [hereinafter FACING AMERICA'S TRASH] (noting that
people with NIMBY attitudes have opposed siting new landfills in their areas
and that the same people would probably oppose incineration and recycling facilities as well); Shipping Out the Trash, 18 ENvTL. FORUM, Sept./Oct. 1991, at
28 (describing the conflict between those states that import wastes and cry out
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capacity has resulted in a nationwide garbage disposal crisis. 4
More than fifteen million tons of garbage cross state lines
each year.5 Some states, struggling to plan for and accommodate their own solid waste, are attempting to use their regulatory powers to stop or slow the flow of waste imported to their
landfills. 6 In contrast, others are using their regulatory powers
"NIMBY," and those that rely on the Commerce Clause to protect their ability
to export).
4. Landfills remain the most common destinations for solid waste, receiving 80% of municipal solid waste. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at
15. Of the nation's 20,000 landfills, 14,000 dosed between 1978 and 1988, and
half of those remaining open will close by 1995. Phillips, supra note 1, at Al.
New EPA regulations placing stricter constraints on landfills are expected to
accelerate landfill closings. Id. Lack of local landfill capacity in some areas
has induced private companies to try to purchase large areas of land for longhauled waste, inciting controversy and resentment. See Dan Fagin, Badlands
in Demand, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1991, at 5 (Connecticut-based company trying
to purchase land on Indian reservation in South Dakota for largest landfill in
the country); Kriz, supra note 2, at 2540 (describing problems caused by imported waste absorbing local capacity). Communities may receive some benefits, however, from "hosting" large private landfills. See Jeff Bailey,
Economics of Trash, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at Al (discussing payment of
"host fees" by waste disposal companies in order to entice areas to permit
large landfills for imported waste); Phillips, supra note 1, at Al (community
receipt of percentage of "tipping fees" eases local opposition to landfill for imported waste).
5. See Shipping Out the Trash, supra note 3, at 28 (stating that it is often
cheaper to haul waste long distances than to dispose of it locally). Interstate
transportation of solid waste appears to have increased. FACING AMERICA'S
TRASH, supra note 3, at 274-75; see also James E. McCarthy et al., Memorandum to the Senate Environment and Public Works Comm., reprintedin Interstate Transport and Disposal of Solid Waste: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on EnvironmentalProtection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 235 (1990) (accounting of which states import and which export waste).
6. In 1978 the United States Supreme Court held that a New Jersey regulation prohibiting the importing of solid waste to both public and private
landfills violated the Commerce Clause. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978). This decision has not stopped states from taking measures
to protect themselves from imported waste. States, however, must take circuitous routes to avoid violating the Commerce Clause if they wish protect instate disposal capacity by preventing the importing of waste. See Stephen M.
Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DIcK. L. REv. 131
(1990) (discussing Pennsylvania's efforts to slow the flow of waste to its limited landfill space); Robert Meltz, State DiscriminationAgainst Imported
Solid Waste: ConstitutionalRoadblocks, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,383 (Sept. 1990) (discussing the use by states of both the market-participant
exception and fee systems to block or inhibit imported waste, and litigation resulting from these efforts); David Pomper, Note, Recycling Philadelphia v.
New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural"Resources and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1337 (1989) (suggesting at least five methods states could use to protect in-state disposal
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to preclude waste exports in efforts to create and sustain instate waste disposal capacity. These states are implementing
statewide integrated waste management plans7 that either authorize intrastate regions to keep their waste or institute statewide flow control regulations.8 While integrated waste
management plans in states such as Rhode Island and Minnesota promote state goals, they interfere with the interstate shipment of solid waste.
In 1976 Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) 9 because "the problems of waste disposal ...
[had] become a matter national in scope and in concern. '1 0 RCRA created a comprehensive regulatory system for
managing the nation's hazardous waste but left the responsibility for managing nonhazardous solid waste to state, regional,
and local authorities." During the 1980s, American citizens
and lawmakers focused on addressing the nation's hazardous
capacity); Rudy Abramson, Backlash Over Trash Exports Builds, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1991, at A28 (reviewing various strategies states employ to keep out
foreign waste).
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 115A.01-.991 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19-1
to -39 (1989); see also AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 16-19 (listing components of such a plan).
8. Flow control is a governmental entity's control of the disposal of solid
waste within a specific geographic area. It is accomplished by directing haulers
to deliver waste to a designated solid waste disposal facility. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6406(a)(31) (1991). Flow control can be an essential part of effective planning. See FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 304; N.C.
Vasuki, Solid Waste Authorities: Getting Movement on Needed Projects,SOLID
WASTE & POWER, Aug. 1991, at 20; see also C. Baird Brown, A 0hecklist for
Legally Enforceable Obligations to Use Disposal Services, in MUNIcIPAL SOLID

WASTE: DISPOSAL STRATEGIES, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND CON.
TRACTS AND FINANCING 323, 325 (ALI-ABA Course of Study: Materials, No.
C355 (1988)) (discussing the importance of ensuring that "tons [of waste] come
through the door" for both financing facilities and fulfilling any recycling or
energy contracts); Kelly Outten, Note, Waste to Energy: Environmental and
Local Government Concerns, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 373, 381-83 (1985) (discussing
the importance of flow control in financing waste-to-energy facilities).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). RCRA addresses both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes; this Note focuses on some of the problems surrounding nonhazardous waste, particularly municipal solid waste.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6240 (addressing the
problems created by rapidly increasing volumes of discarded materials in association with the growing scarcity of disposal capacity).
11. See FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 8. In contrast to the
approach adopted for nonhazardous waste, Congress addressed the hazardous
waste problems facing the nation with a strict "cradle-to-grave" regulatory
program. See IA FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.03,
at 4-112.3 (1991).
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waste problems but paid little attention to the growing problem
of how America was handling its garbage. 12 Thus, Congress
truly left planning to the states, resulting in a variety of state
efforts.13
Congress is in the process of reauthorizing RCRA. 14 Interstate transportation of solid waste is the most controversial issue in the reauthorization process.' 5 This Note focuses on an
important aspect of the interstate transportation debate-a
state's use of its police powers to require that waste be disposed
of in state. 16 Flow control regulations are often necessary to
ensure the financial security of waste disposal facilities and programs. Under current federal law, however, flow control regulations
that
affect
interstate
commerce
may
be
unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note briefly examines RCRA's legislative history, Congress's approach to facilitating state planning, and the
relevant Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations.
Part II describes the Rhode Island and Minnesota solid waste
plans. Part III describes relevant Commerce Clause litigation.
12. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA" The "Mind-Numbing"
Provisionsof the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.

(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,273 (May 1991). Both the Solid Waste Disposal Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334, and the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, amended
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). These amendments focused on hazardous waste and did not significantly alter those sections of RCRA pertaining to
non-hazardous waste management. See FACING AMERICA's TRASH, supra note
3, at 350; 1A GRAD, supra note 11, § 4.03.
13. State plans which have emerged since RCRA's enactment are diverse
in "content and utility." FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 11; see id.
at 303-08 (describing both local and state planning efforts and the limited extent of federal involvement); see also AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 1617 (noting that state planning should reflect its unique needs); Jonathan P.
Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: IncreasedFederalInvolvement
as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal,79 GEO. L.J. 567,
568-69 (1991) (advocating increased federal role in state planning).
14. The reauthorization process began in 1988 and has involved many proposed amendments and hearings. See Abramson, supra note 6, at A28; Hill,
supra note 12, at 10,275-76.
15. See Abramson, supra note 6, at A28.
16. If a municipal government provides waste collection and disposal services, flow control is not controversial. However, when private haulers provide
these services, flow control measures affect the free market of waste disposal
services. See Brown, supra note 8, at 326-28; Outten, supra note 8, at 382; see
also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848, 854 n.2, 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (assuming that a local government can control the flow of local waste, but striking a local law directing the flow of foreign waste hauled
and processed by a private business).
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Part IV addresses the essential problems raised by the use of
flow control to interfere with an existing stream of interstate
commerce. Part IV argues that state control of its own waste is
consistent with federal waste management goals articulated in
RCRA and in subsequent federal policy. This Note proposes
that Congress explicitly recognize a state's right to withdraw its
waste from the stream of interstate commerce when doing so
furthers local interests and coincides with federal policy.
I. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT
A.

BACKGROUND OF RCRA

RCRA is the culmination of federal awareness and involvement in solid waste management. 17 Congress enacted RCRA in
1976 out of concern that despite earlier legislation, state waste
management planning was inadequate or non-existent. I8 Con17. Congress first addressed the problems of solid waste management in
the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA), Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). See William L.
Kovacs & John F. Klucsik, The New FederalRole in Solid Waste Management
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
205, 214 (1977). Prior to the SWDA, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare's Bureau of Solid Waste Management addressed waste disposal from a
health and safety perspective. Id- at 213. The SWDA was a "modest effort" to
deal directly with solid waste management problems. Roger W. Andersen, The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: CZosing the Gap, 1978 Wis.
L. REV. 633, 641.
Congress amended the SWDA by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970). Despite these amendments, the SWDA retained the "basic philosophy of the 1965 Act, that the federal government
should play an advisory, and not a regulatory, role." Andersen, supra, at 642
(comparing federal strict regulatory approach in the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), with the "tentative" role taken toward solid waste);
cf.American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 699 (Or.
Ct. App. 1973) (finding state environmental laws in harmony with the SWDA
(as amended in 1970), which expressly disclaimed preemption in favor of local
control over waste related issues).
18. Congress viewed the waste management problem as one of planning
and "anticipate[d] that federal guidelines for planning will foster the necessary
cooperation between the federal government, states, and local regions, to meet
[the] very broad and flexible objectives of this act." H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra
note 10, at 33, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6271. States historically were
minimally involved in waste management and usually delegated responsibility
to municipalities. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 348; see 1A
GRAD, supra note 11, § 4.02[1].
The SWDA was intended to begin the process of comprehensive state
planning. Andersen, supra note 17, at 635-36, 646. Although 48 states formulated some type of plan, the overall approach was piecemeal. Id at 643. Funding for solid waste management programs under the SWDA decreased
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gress concluded that waste management practices were diverse
and uncoordinated, "often having less than optimal results."'19
RCRA shifted the focus of solid waste management from transporting solid waste to the local dump toward a system that encouraged comprehensive state planning. RCRA did not,
however, devise any system of federal regulation for municipal
program
solid waste.20 Rather, it established an incentive-based
21
that relied on voluntary state involvement.
RCRA provided federal assistance to states that developed
plans satisfying the statutory and EPA guidelines. 22 RCRA's
federal assistance, the heart of the federal solid waste program,
was not especially effective. Federal financial assistance ceased
entirely in 1988.23
B.

EFFECTIVE STATE PLANNING UNDER

RCRA

In developing RCRA, Congress was particularly concerned
with the difficulties in financing and constructing waste mansignificantly during the 1970s, and there was little incentive to address waste
management issues. See 1A GRAD, supra note 11, § 4.03[1], at 4-62.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6247-48. Although Congress realized that local solutions were
not working, it did not remove the responsibility for waste disposal regulation
from state and local government. Andersen, supra note 17, at 645.
20. See Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 17, at 223. RCRA did not authorize
the federal government to impose plans upon states that failed to devise their
own. The only cost of noncompliance is the loss of federal assistance. See 42
U.S.C. § 6947(b)(3) (1988).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 32-33, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6270-71 ("[Fjederal assistance should be an incentive for state
and local authorities to act to solve the discarded materials problem. At this
time preemption of this problem is undesirable, inefficient, and damaging to
local initiative."); AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that the
ultimate responsibility for waste management falls on state and local government; the federal government only provides goals and assistance).
22. Congress designed 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6943 to provide the states with
"reasonable flexible guidelines." H.R. REP.No. 1491, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6242. The guidelines appear in 40 C.F.R. § 256
(1991). State plans must at least identify a responsible authority, prohibit the
establishment of new open dumps, provide for closing or upgrading existing
ones, and remove barriers to long-term contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a) (1988).
See Andersen, supra note 17, at 665-73 (detailing the requirements for state
plans and discussing some of the inconsistencies in the minimum
requirements).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 6948(a)(1) (1988); see also FACING AMERICA'S TRASH,
supra note 3, at 305, 307 (stating that federal attention to and funding for municipal solid waste ended in the early 1980s); Meyers, supra note 13, at 569 &
n.18; cf. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 305 (stating that despite
the lack of federal funding, most states continued to plan, but those plans did
not necessarily follow RCRA guidelines).
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agement facilities. The RCRA provision ensuring that states
could enter into long-term contracts for the supply of solid
waste to resource recovery facilities, 24 and the provision for Resource Recovery and Conservation Panels to help state and local governments plan for solid waste management, 25 indicate
that Congress intended to promote effective state planning.
Congress recognized that the ability to guarantee waste

26
volume is necessary to the success of a waste disposal facility.

Congress concluded that private companies were "capable of
and willing to enter into resource recovery ventures if a sufficient volume of refuse [could] be guaranteed over a sufficiently
long period of time." 27 The barriers to private involvement primarily stemmed from local governments' inability to guarantee
the volume of waste necessary to maintain facilities and thus to
attract investors to proposed projects.2 8 Congress attempted to
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5) (1988); see also id. § 6903(11) ("'[L]ong term
contract' means, when used in relation to solid waste supply, a contract of sufficient duration to assure the viability of a resource recovery facility (to the
extent that such viability depends upon solid waste supply).").
25. Id. § 6913.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 34, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6272. One of the major concerns addressed in the long process
of developing RCRA was the inability of state or local governments to enter
into long-term contracts. Congress stressed the importance of this impediment
to improved solid waste management, stating that "the federal government
will not commit technical or financial resources to aid states in the establishment of resource recovery systems if the states maintain barriers to the establishment of such systems." Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6246.
Congress held many hearings in which it heard from a variety of experts
concerning investment in waste management facilities. See, e.g., Economic and
InstitutionalBarriers to PrivateInvestment in Resource Conservationand Recovery, Symposium on Resource Conservation and Recovery: Subcomm. on
Transportationand Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter Symposium] (focusing particularly on issues surrounding the economic feasibility of waste disposal facilities and the importance of guaranteed waste flows); see also H.R. REP. No.
1491, supra note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6246 (topics discussed at symposium).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 34, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6272. In 1978, however, private investors still hesitated to finance projects. Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 17, at 257-58. In 1977, H.R. 1214
was introduced "to provide financial assistance for waste recovery projects,
and ease the capital crunch such projects may face." Id. at 258 (citing H.R.
1214, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
28. "[In order to get the facility built, the bond holders require the community delivery requirements or the community delivery contracts." Symposium, supra note 26, at 105 (statement of Stephen Lewis). However, the
ability of a government to enter into long-term contracts assumes control over
the waste stream; this is not always the case. See Brown, supra note 8, at 32629; see also Outten, supra note 8, at 382 (a municipality may not have control
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ensure that facilities would maintain a consistent waste flow by
conditioning federal assistance upon the removal of state or local barriers to long-term contracts for securing volumes of
waste. 29 Some members of Congress proposed loan guarantee
programs for waste recovery projects, but the final version of
RCRA did not include these proposals.3 0 Ultimately, the economics of better waste disposal practices and effective planning
were tightly interwoven in both the legislation and in practice.
In addition to requiring the removal of barriers to longterm contracts, RCRA made Resource Recovery and Conservation Panels available to help states develop successful state and
local waste management programs. 31 Congress recognized that
over its waste stream if it contracts with private haulers for collection). Guarantees of waste volume sufficient to insure viability are critical in marketing
bonds for many waste facility projects. See, e.g., Central Iowa Refuse Sys. v.
Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d
1187, 1188-89 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); see
also Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 785 (D.R.I.), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004
(1st Cir. 1991) (Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp. claimed that its
regulation was enacted, in part, to facilitate the sale of bonds for a proposed
waste-to-energy facility.). The problems of building a facility based on unguaranteed waste flows were recognized in United States v. Oourke:
It is one thing to address, in the planning mode, the overall needs of
Westchester County for waste disposal. It is quite another to proceed,
in the absence of adequate commitments from municipalities and private carters, to build a facility capable of handling the totality of committed and uncommitted waste. A capital project of this nature is
typically financed by the issuance of revenue obligation bonds. How
are the bonds to be underwritten and sold in the absence of adequate
user commitments to generate the cash flow needed to finance the
debt service on the bonds?
943 F.2d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 1991).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 256.01(b)(5) (1991) (forbidding state or local law from prohibiting local governments from entering into
"long-term contracts for the supply of solid waste to resource recovery facilities"). This requirement is incorporated into state plans. See, e.g., 7 DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6401(b)(5) (1991). The 1980 amendments to RCRA stressed
materials conservation and recovery and provided federal assistance to "analyze legal, institutional and economic impediments to material and energy recovery." See 1A GRAD, supra note 11, § 4.03[5].
30. Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 17, at 257 n.190. The proposed United
States Resource Recovery Corporation had two functions related to promoting
construction of recovery facilities: to guarantee investments in projects and to
sell insurance against losses caused by insufficient waste volumes. 1d Instead
of this proposal, funds were made available for demonstration facilities. Id.at
257 n.190.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 6913 (1988). The panels facilitate local planning efforts
by providing expertise and advice, including "evaluation of the proposals; obtaining of a suitable financial package; deciding who should and will dump at
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developing projects would involve "large expenditures for the
construction [of facilities] ... or vast legal problems coordinating numerous communities in an effort to obtain sufficient
waste volume, so that... [the facilities] would be economically
32

viable."

EPA regulations, promulgated pursuant to RCRA, stress
that state planning must reflect the projects' financial feasibility. Thus, "[t]he volume of wastes within a region will influence the technology choices for recovery and disposal ... .,,33
These regulations require that a region generate a sufficient
volume of waste to support the objectives of the state plan. 4

C. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL PoLICY
Since 1976, the portions of RCRA which address nonhazardous wastes have essentially remained unchanged, marking a
the facility," but not by providing funding. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10,
at 15, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6252. The 1980 amendments did add to
the duties of the EPA with respect to the type of technical assistance that the
panels could provide. See 42 U.S.C. § 6948(d)(1). Specifically, § 6948(d)(3) reflects the importance of developing alternative energy sources. Section
6948(d)(3) provides, in part, that the Administrator may
assist in the removal... of legal, institutional, and economic impediments which have the effect of impeding the development of systems
and facilities to recover energy and materials from municipal
waste ....
Such impediments may include ....
(B) impediments to the financing of facilities to conserve or recover energy and materials from municipal waste through the exercise of State and local authority to issue revenue bonds and the
use of State and local credit assistance; and
(C) impediments to institutional arrangements necessary to undertake projects... including the creation of special districts, authorities, or corporations where necessary having the power to
secure the supply of waste of a project, to conserve resources, to
implement the project, and to undertake related activities.
Id. § 6948(d)(3); see also 1A GRAD, supra note 11, § 4.03[5], at 4-94.
32. Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 17, at 239. Congress wanted to provide
expertise to localities in order to prevent the continued inadequacy and inefficiency of state planning that persisted despite the earlier federal involvement.
See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 14-15, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6251-53.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 235.10(c) (1991).
34. Id. § 255.10(a)(1), (c). In the legislative history of RCRA, Congress referred to Wisconsin's regionalized waste management planning as a model for
state planning. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6240. A significant section in Wisconsin's plan was entitled
"Required Use of Facilities." Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl,
235 N.W.2d 648, 656 (1975). This provision empowered the Wisconsin Solid
Waste Recycling Authority to require the use of its facilities in order to make
them financially viable, among other reasons. Id.

1228

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1219

period of inattention to the growing problems of solid waste
disposal. 35 In 1989, the EPA redirected its attention to the
problems of municipal solid waste. In a report entitled The
Solid Waste Dilemma: An Agenda for Action, the EPA sought
to identify the shortcomings in current solid waste disposal pol36
icies and establish national goals for solid waste management.
The Agenda for Action encourages states to utilize integrated
waste management-involving a combination, in order of desirability, of source reduction, recycling, combustion and landfil37
ling-to meet particular local waste disposal needs.
35. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 347. The establishment of
several federal energy programs which provided assistance and funding for
waste-to-energy facilities, however, indicates that the government did not entirely ignore waste disposal issues. See id at 299. Yet, these energy-related activities did not survive into the 1980s when the focus shifted to control of
hazardous waste. Id36. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 1-4. The government's current
effort to deal with municipal solid waste issues is prompted by the problems
arising from the significant decline in landfill capacity nationwide and the difficulties governments face in efforts to site new waste disposal facilities. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 8. Controversies surrounding
interstate shipments of solid waste are also a factor influencing the government to address the issue. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 10,383 (discussing the
enactment of laws to ban or discourage importation of waste).
37. Integrated waste management is the combination of four waste management practices "to safely and effectively handle the municipal solid waste
stream with the least adverse impact on human health and the environment."
AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 16-17. A community can "custom-design" a system, employing management methods according to local needs and
resources. Id Several states have included integrated waste management in
their waste management plans. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 115A.02 (1990 & Supp.
1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19-3(11) (1989). The four practices are source reduction, recycling, combustion, and landfilling.
Source reduction efforts focus on manufacturers and call for a reduction
in the amount and toxicity of packaging. Consumers are called upon to alter
their buying habits to encourage manufacturers to practice source reduction.
AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 18.
Recycling directs useful materials away from landfills or waste burning
facilities, reducing both waste volume and demand for raw materials. Id The
EPA set a goal of recycling 25% of waste by 1992. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH,
supra note 3, at 24.
Combustion reduces the bulk of waste, but the resulting ash must be buried in a landfill. Some combustion facilities also produce energy from waste.
AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 19.
In 1976, when Congress enacted RCRA, it concluded that "although land
is too valuable a national resource to be needlessly polluted by discarded
materials, most solid waste is disposed of on land .... [A]lternatives to existing methods of land disposal must be developed." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(1), (8)
(1988). Landfilling, the least-favored method of waste disposal, "is essential to
handle wastes such as nonrecyclable waste and the noncombustibles .... A
well-constructed, properly operated landfill should not present a significant
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Consistent with the purpose behind RCRA, the EPA intended
the Agenda for Action to provide national leadership but leave
the actual planning and implementation to state and local
governments.
In preparing the Agenda for Action, the EPA stated that
state and local governments "should assume responsibility for
the wastes generated within their jurisdictions."3 8 The EPA
does not, however, advocate control of the interstate transportation of waste, either imports or exports, because it believes
that "[s]uch restrictions could stymie the concept of sub-state or
multi-state solid wastes management solutions, which the EPA
also encourages." 39
Congress is currently in the process of reauthorizing
RCRA, focusing on the federal role in solid waste management.
In the past three congressional sessions, more than 100 bills
that would modify RCRA's statutory scheme have been introduced.40 Most proposals would make state planning mandatory
health risk." AGENDA FOR ACTIoN, supra note 1, at 19. Landfilling continues
to be the prevalent means of waste disposal. See supra note 4. The EPA encourages alternatives to landfills "as the preferred means of solid waste management whenever technically and economically feasible." 40 C.F.R.
§ 256.31(e) (1991).
38. The Solid Waste Dilemma: An Agenda for Action; Availability of a
Draft Report and Announcement of Public Hearings, 53 Fed. Reg. 36,885
(1988).
39. Id. But see FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that

while RCRA encourages "interstate regional planning" this has not been implemented). Although 40 C.F.R. § 256.42(h) (1991) provides that "[t]he State
plan should provide for substate cooperation and policies for free and unrestricted movement of solid and hazardous waste across State and local
boundaries," this provision should not be considered in isolation. Indiscriminate movement of waste, resulting from a lack of disposal capacity and planning, is not consistent with federal policy. See Keith Johnston, Comment,
State Embargo of Solid Waste: Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution
to a PressingProblem?,82 DicK. L. REV. 325, 348-49 (1977) (discussing the implications of making waste exporting a constitutional right).
40. See Recent Developments in the Congress, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,140 (Feb. 1992). Much of the controversy centers on compensating
states which receive imported waste. See, e.g., H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., -2d Sess.
(1991) (revising the requirements for state planning by adding capacity estimates, source reduction, and recycling goals; setting national recycling policy;
encouraging public sector procurement of recycled products; and authorizing
states either to charge differential fees for imported waste on an increasing
scale or to freeze import amounts). For discussions of other proposals see Hill,
supra note 12, at 10,275-76 (discussing bills proposed by Senator Luken and
Senator Baucus in the 101st Congress); Meyers, supra note 13, at 585-89 (proposing legislation that would requires states to develop "capacity assurance
plans" similar to those required for low-level hazardous wastes); Abramson,
supra note 6, at A28; see also Meltz, supra note 6, at 10,392 (discussing the
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and would encourage the development of in-state waste disposal capacity. States which now receive large amounts of imported waste are pushing for the ability to ban or charge
differential fees for out-of-state waste. 41 The controversy over
interstate waste shipments has slowed efforts to pass a comprehensive RCRA package.4 Regardless of the outcome of the interstate commerce debate, the federal role in solid waste
43
management is likely to increase with any new legislation.
II. STATE PLANS: CONTROLLING WASTE EXPORTS
Although many states have comprehensive waste management plans, there is no uniformity among state approaches."
State efforts to address solid waste disposal issues often focus
on goals and on methods for financing the facilities needed to
carry out the state's plan. 45 States are necessarily concerned

with guaranteeing the volume of waste necessary to sustain
46
solid waste facilities.
Historically, the use of police power to control waste colleccommerce clause implications of various bills introduced during the 101st
Congress).
41. See Shipping Out the Trash, supra note 3, at 30.
42. See Kriz, supra note 2, at 2540.
43. See FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 350; Hill, supra note
12, at 10,275-76. However, the federal role in this area is not likely to match its
role in regulating hazardous wastes. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3,
at 350. The Bush administration does not support changing RCRA. See Abramson, supra note 6, at A28; Kriz, supra note 2, at 2540.
44. See FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 306-07; 1A GRAD, supra
note 11, § 4.02[2][a]. As early as 1905 the Supreme Court addressed the
problems of waste disposal for cities and densely populated areas, noting that
"[m]any of the questions involved in municipal sanitation have proved to be
difficult of solution. There is no mode of disposing of garbage and refuse matter, as found in cities and dense populations, which is universally followed."
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 320 (1905).
45. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, Supra note 3, at 304-08. Rhode Island and
Delaware have centralized waste management in single authorities. Id. Other
states, in contrast, leave waste management primarily at the county or municipal level, with varying degrees of state involvement. Id.
46. See Outten, supra note 8, at 381-82 (stating that the financing of facilities is often contingent on a guaranteed flow); see also Brown, supra note 8, at
325-29 (discussing the need to have control over waste in order to finance
projects). Congress was also concerned with guaranteeing volumes of waste.
H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 34, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6272. Flow control is related to successful financing of waste management facilities in many states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6406(a)(31) (1991);
FLA. STAT. §§ 403.7063, 403.713 (1986 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 1304-B (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 115A.80 (1990 & Supp.
1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19-10(40) (1989); see also FACING AMERICA'S TRASH,
supra note 3, at 338 & n.40 (noting that flow controls "to ensure sufficient re-

1992]

WASTE MANAGEMENT

1231

tion and disposal served an important health and safety function.47 Flow control mechanisms can also serve to ensure that a
sufficient volume of waste will enter disposal facilities to make
them financially feasible. 48 Rhode Island and Minnesota included flow control powers in their comprehensive state waste
management plans. While these state plans do not approach
planning and waste management identically, each utilizes police
powers to ensure that the waste management systems are financially viable.
Rhode Island enacted comprehensive legislation which created a single authority responsible for developing and implementing a statewide solid waste management plan. 49 The
Rhode
Island Solid Waste
Management
Corporation
(RISWMC) has broad powers to carry out its responsibilities, 50
including the authority to "require all persons and municipalities ... to use the services and facilities of the corporation."5 1
fuse have been upheld," but also noting some concerns over use of this
mechanism).
47. "Control of local sanitation, including garbage collection and disposal
... is a traditional, paradigmatic example of the exercise of municipal police
powers reserved to state and local governments under the Tenth Amendment." Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1192 (6th Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). In two cases concerning
designation of facilities to receive waste, the Supreme Court recognized that
control over the collection and disposal of waste was a legitimate, non-arbitrary exercise of police powers to protect health and safety. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 324-25 (1905); Gardner v.
Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1905).
48. See, e.g., Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid
Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985); Hybud Equip. Corp., 654 F.2d at 1191. See generally Deborah T. Poritz,
New Jersey'sApproac." Regulation of Waste Flows-Control of Rates, in MuNICIPAL SOLID WAsTE: DISPOsAL STRATEGIES, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION,
AND CONTRACTS AND FINANCING 185, 187-89 (ALI-ABA Course of Study:

Materials, No. C355 (1988)) (describing New Jersey's aggressive flow control
measures aimed at ensuring the successful development of expensive resource
recovery facilities and state of the art landfills).
49. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19-2(4) (1989).
50. RISWMC controls all waste disposal services provided in the state, including licensing of facilities. All contracts for waste disposal services are also
"subject to the approval of the corporation... [and] conditioned upon a finding... that the proposed contract will not impair the ability of the corporation
to meet its contractual obligations to its bondholders and others." Id. § 23-1913(a)(1). RISWMC also controls licensing of all in-state facilities. Id. § 23-18-8
to -9. Additionally, the Act declares RISWMC to be a market participant in
the waste services market, enabling it to restrict use of its facilities to in-state
waste. Id. § 23-19-2(11), (12); see Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204,
1212 (D.R.I. 1987) (upholding waste import ban on grounds that Rhode Island
is a market participant).
51. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19-4(c) (1989). Currently, Rhode Island subsidizes
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The enabling legislation for RISWMC requires that it rely entirely on income from fees to finance its programs. 52
RISWMC used its statutory powers to enact flow control
regulations. 53 Before the enactment of the regulations, residential waste was disposed of at RISWMC's facilities, but a signifi54
cant amount of commercial waste was hauled out of state.
The flow control regulations were intended to stop the flow of
55
commercial waste out of the state.
In contrast to the approach taken by Rhode Island, Minnesota's Waste Management Act5 6 provides a comprehensive plan
for improving and integrating waste management on a local
level.5 7 The Act places waste management responsibility on
county government but also encourages regional cooperation
and planning within a structured, statewide planning effort.5
Importantly, the Legislature designed the Act, in part, to effectuate the "[o]rderly and deliberate development and financial
security of waste facilities including disposal facilities."5 9 To
this end, the Act provides for localized control over the flow of
solid waste to a particular facility.60 Any district or county can
designate a particular facility to receive all of the waste genermunicipal solid waste disposal costs and uses commercial waste fees to finance
projects. Id- § 23-19-13(f)-(h).
52. Id § 23-19-13(a)(2).
53. See Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 777-78, (D.R.I.) (discussing the regulations which diverted the waste flow), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir.
1991).
54. See i&dat 777.
55. Id at 778; see also Outten, supra note 8, at 382 (discussing the controversial exercise of police powers over waste not controlled by local
government).
56. MINN. STAT. § lSA (1990 & Supp. 1991).
57. Id- § 115A.02.
58. Under Minnesota law the primary responsibility for the management
of solid waste lies with county government. MINN. STAT. § 473.149 (1990). The
Act, however, recognizes that the activities of individual political subdivisions
are not adequate to implement "integrated and coordinated solid waste management systems." Id § 115A.62. Other states similarly place responsibility
for planning on local units of government. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 1304-B (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (requiring each municipality to provide
disposal services for domestic and commercial solid waste generated in the
municipality); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 299.401-.437 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (establishing regulatory powers at the state level, with much of the planning delegated to county governments); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-06 (1991) (requiring
all land in the state to be part of a solid waste management district).
59. MINN. STAT. § 115A.02(a)(5) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
60. In order to further the state policies and purposes ... and to advance the public purposes served by effective solid waste management, the legislature finds and declares that it may be necessary...
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ated in that district. 6 '
Both states' waste management legislation enabled responsible bodies to enact regulations that would interrupt interstate
commerce by taking the state's waste out of the stream of commerce. The states enacted these regulations to guarantee waste
volume and to ensure the financial stability of facilities intended to achieve integrated waste management. Private waste
disposal services have challenged the flow control regulations
62
under the Commerce Clause.
to authorize a qualifying solid waste management district or county to

designate a solid waste processing or disposal facility.
Id. § 115A.80. "Designation" means that a specific facility is identified to receive all of the solid waste generated in an area. Id. § 115A.81.
61. Id. § 115A.80. The plan must provide a comprehensive analysis of the
facility, whether it promotes state policies, the costs of designation, and the necessity of designation in relation to the project, i.e., "whether the designation
is necessary for the financial support of the facility; ... [and] whether less restrictive methods for ensuring an adequate solid waste supply are available."
Id. § 115A.84.
62. See e.g., Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, No. CIV 3-91-0375, 1992
WL 31418 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 1992); Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 777 (D.R.I.),
aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
In the past, private waste disposal services challenged flow control regulations under federal antitrust laws. See Keith C. Hetrick, The Federal Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984 and the 1985 Amendments to the Florida
Antitrust Act: A Survey and Analysis of FloridaLocal Government Antitrust
Liability, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 77, 93-94 (1985) (stating that the control of
solid waste "characteristically involve[s] exclusive contracts or regulations restricting competition," and that a survey of Florida local governments revealed
that government solid waste disposal services were perceived to be among the
most vulnerable to antitrust litigation). However, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982), extended antitrust immunity to anticompetitive municipal regulations enacted as part of "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." See also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1346 (1991) (holding that
federal antitrust laws do not apply to the anticompetitive activities of local
governments implementing state policy). Thus, challenges under federal antitrust laws will fail if the flow controls are pursuant to state policy. See Central Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d
419, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding similar regulations), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1003 (1985); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195-96
(6th Cir. 1981) (upholding regulations which barred competition with the public facility and required all haulers and collectors of waste to use the facility),
vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848, 851-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a town exercising control over the waste stream is immune to claims under antitrust laws
but that those parts of the controls affecting interstate commerce violate the
Commerce Clause). Many states have clearly granted local governments the
authority to control waste flows. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 6422 (1991) (specifically barring competitive activities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19-13(a)(1) (1989)
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III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A
LIMITATION ON STATE REGULATION
When it passed RCRA, Congress did not preempt state regulation of municipal solid waste management, 63 but it also did
not expressly grant states the power to regulate in ways that
interfere with interstate commerce.6 4 Thus, litigants have
raised Commerce Clause challenges to state waste regulations
which interfere with interstate commerce.6 5
A. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States
affirmatively grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce... among the several States." In interpreting the scope
of the federal commerce power, the Supreme Court has noted
that the Commerce Clause implies limits on state power to inhibit interstate commerce even when Congress has not acted.66
(same). The immunity from antitrust laws does not, however, protect state
regulations from challenges brought under the Commerce Clause.
63. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978).
Congress can exercise its powers under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2, to "occupy" a field, preempting state regulation. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 9.1 (4th ed. 1991). Congress did not intend to "occupy" the field of nonhazardous waste management.
H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 33, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6271.
64. In City of Philadelphia,the Supreme Court identified New Jersey's
waste import ban as consistent with RCRA. Thus, the only question was
whether New Jersey's law violated the Commerce Clause. 437 U.S. at 620-21.
Absent a congressional grant of authority to states to regulate commerce, the
"negative implications of the Commerce Clause... are ingredients of the valid
state law." Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1981).
65. For a concise summary of such cases, see Meltz, supra note 6, at
10,384-90. In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed City of Philadelphiain
two recent decisions. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 60 U.S.L.W. 4438 (U.S. June 1, 1992) (No. 91-636)
(overturning intercounty restrictions on solid waste disposal as a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Managment, Inc. v. Hunt, 60
U.S.L.W. 4433 (U.S. June 1, 1992) (No. 91-471) (overturning a tax on out-ofstate hazardous wastes).
66. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine originated in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), in which Justice Marshall recognized the
Commerce Clause as an absolute grant of power to Congress that precluded
any state regulation of interstate commerce. In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984), the Supreme Court affirmed the "implied restraint upon state regulatory powers." The Court has
also referred to this as the "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause. See
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
Some commentators argue that Congress has the power to review state
regulations which burden interstate commerce, and that inaction, or "inertia,"
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Because the Constitution does not expressly regulate state commerce power, the Court and commentators have referred to
67
this doctrine as the dormant Commerce Clause.
Despite the Commerce Clause, the Court has recognized
that "'in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress,
there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it.' ",68 A state may not, however, use its regulatory
power to protect in-state economic interests. 69 Therefore, this
should not be turned against the states by the judiciary. E.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuxE L.J. 569, 592-94; see also Daniel A.
Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 412 (1986) (arguing that congressional inactivity in a certain area
may be intended to favor the rights of states).
This notion is particularly relevant in assessing the validity of state solid
waste management planning. Congress explicitly intended for this to be a
state responsibility, and therefore did not preempt state regulations. Rather
than limiting judicial review to whether a state law is consistent with RCRA,
however, the Court has required conformity with the dormant Commerce
Clause. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623.
67. The restraints placed upon state regulations "appear nowhere in the
words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of
this Court." City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623. Some commentators have
criticized the Supreme Court's adoption of this role. See Farber, supra note 66,
at 412 (questioning whether the judiciary should exercise its power to act in
the absence of congressional action); Radish & Nugent, supra note 66, at 588-90
(criticizing the courts' use of dormant Commerce Clause theory to infer congressional intent that an area remain unregulated); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125 (arguing that the Court
has stretched the justifications for reviewing state legislation that discriminates or interferes with interstate commerce); see also Donald H. Rgan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIc-. L. REv. 1091 (1986) (criticizing the use of the dormant
Commerce Clause except to strike protectionist state legislation).
68. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1976) (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)); see also
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1981) (stating that
unexercised federal regulatory power does not preclude state regulation); City
of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623 ("Although the Constitution gives Congress
the power to regulate commerce among the States, many subjects of potential
federal regulation under that power inevitably escape congressional attention
'because of their local character and their number and diversity."' (quoting
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185
(1938))).
69. See City of.Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624 (It "does not matter that the
State has shut the article of commerce inside the State in one case and outside
the State in the other. What is crucial is the attempt by one state to isolate
itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 44
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"residuum of power" provides a narrow area in which states
70
may impose an "incidental" burden on interstate commerce.
The central thrust of the Court's Commerce Clause analysis proscribes economic isolationism and protectionism. 71 In
evaluating state regulations challenged under the Commerce
Clause, the Court has developed two basic levels of scrutiny.
First, regulations which, on their face, discriminate against articles in commerce are subject to strict scrutiny. 72 The Court
will look at both the purpose and effect of the regulation. If
the regulation discriminates for protectionist purposes the
Court applies a virtual "per se rule of invalidity."7 3 However,
the state has an opportunity to show that the regulation furthers legitimate local interests unrelated to economic protectionism, and that the regulation is the least burdensome means
of achieving this interest.74 If the state carries this burden, its
regulation will survive the challenge.75
(1980) (stating that the Commerce Clause "prohibits a state from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition").

70. A state may bar the importation of objects whose value in interstate
commerce is "far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement." City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 622. States may also burden interstate commerce when protecting the health and safety of their residents.
However, the mere existence of a purported health and safety purpose is not
dispositive. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350. Additionally, states may regulate in the
area of "environmental protection and resource conservation" subject to Commerce Clause limitations. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 471 (1981).
Courts also recognize a state's limited right to experiment within its own
borders. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory- and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980). A purpose
of the federal system is to have "diversity of commercial regulation" among
the states; however, Congress can step in if diversity becomes too burdensome.
Regan, supra note 67, at 1177; see also Farber, supra note 66, at 414 (arguing
that state experimentation is important).
71. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350 (identifying the Commerce Clause as an
"overriding requirement of a national 'common market' ").
72. Under strict scrutiny, the burden of showing the discriminatory nature of a regulation falls on the challenging party; however, once the challenging party makes this showing, the burden of proving a legitimate local purpose
shifts to the state. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
73. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624. Protectionism is the use of "regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors." New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74
(1988).
74. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
75. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147-48 (1986) (upholding
Maine's ban on the importation of bait fish because there was no alternative
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Second, the Court applies the lenient test outlined in Pike
v. Bruce Church,Inc. when a state regulation promotes local interests without facially discriminating against goods in interstate commerce. 76 The incidental burden imposed on interstate
commerce must not be "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. '77 States may regulate commerce evenhandedly, that is, when the effects fall evenly on both in- and
out-of-state interests and the burden imposed on interstate
commerce is not clearly excessive relative to the local
78
benefits.
Congress has the power to override the dormant Commerce Clause and grant states the power to regulate commerce
in ways which would otherwise be impermissible.79 In order to
remove the threat of challenges brought under the Commerce
Clause, Congress must "expressly state" its intent to permit
states to regulate in ways which interfere with interstate
80
commerce.
that would adequately protect the state's interest in protecting its native bait
fish supply from disease and infection).
76. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Bruce Church Court stated that it will
uphold an evenhanded state regulation which has an incidental burden on interstate commerce "unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... The extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities." Id at 142 (citation omitted). The standard of
review under the Bruce Church balancing test will depend upon several factors, such as "the presence or absence of a discriminatory effect and the
Court's perception of whether the particular statute at issue deals with a matter of local or national concern." Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too
Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,50 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 47, 58 (1981).
77. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142.
78. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981). A
state may strictly regulate the use of natural resources by its citizens, and
thereby regulate use of that resource by others. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1981) (discussing the ability of a state
to restrict in-state water usage, and thereby restrict out-of-state use); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (indicating that a state
could "slow[] the flow of all waste into the state's remaining landfills"); see
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, § 8-9, at 297-98 (discussing the ability
of states to control natural resources).
79. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,
213 (1983); see also Johnson, supra note 6, at 132 n.11 (noting that Congress
has the power to grant states the ability to ban imports of solid waste).
80. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960.
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B. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO FLOW CONTROLS
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, holding that solid waste
was a legitimate object of commerce protected by the Commerce Clause. 8 ' The Court affirmed City of Philadelphia in
two recent decisions.8 2 In City of Philadelphia,New Jersey had
prohibited the importation of solid waste to landfills located in
the state. New Jersey's purported legitimate interests in its environment and in health and safety did not insulate the facially
discriminatory regulation from Commerce Clause challenge.83
Courts have expanded City of Philadelphiato hold that state
flow controls which ban waste exports are also subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny.84
81. 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). The Court determined that "[t]he harms
caused by waste are said to arise after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that
point, as New Jersey concedes, there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state
waste from domestic waste." Id at 629. But see id, at 632-33 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (equating solid waste with articles posing a danger to the health of
safety of a state's citizens and thereby concluding that a ban on importation
would be permissible, and further arguing that a state must deal with diseased
or hazardous articles produced within its borders, but should not have to accommodate those from elsewhere).
82. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 60 U.S.L.W. 4438 (U.S. June 1, 1992) (No. 91-636) (overturning intercounty restrictions on solid waste disposal as a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 60 U.S.L.W.
4433 (U.S. June 1, 1992) (No. 91-471) (applying the dormant Commerce Clause
to overturn a tax on out-of-state hazardous wastes). The Court noted that the
Fort Gratiot case does not raise questions about policies that "governmental
agencies may pursue in management of publicly owned facilities." 60 U.S.L.W.
at 4439-40.
83. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 625. The Court decided a resolution of actual legislative purpose was unnecessary because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Id at 626.
In this case the means betrayed the ends. Today, New Jersey appears to be
the largest exporter of solid waste. See McCarthy et al., supra note 5, at 244.
84. Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, No. CIV. 3-91-0375, 1992 WL
31418, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 1992); Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 782 (D.R.I.),
aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991). These are not the only challenges to flow control regulations that affected interstate commerce of waste.
In J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857
F.2d 913, 922 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit upheld a regulation which required waste to be processed at a state-owned transfer station, prohibiting the
direct interstate shipment of waste. The plaintiff did not provide evidence of
protectionist intent. Id at 920. The Filiberto court held that the plaintiff's
failure to show a burden on interstate commerce was dispositive. Id The regulation did not prevent interstate commerce; instead, it simply made it more
efficient, although more expensive. Id at 921. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the local government's
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A Preliminary Injunction: Allowing the Flow

RISWMC's flow control regulation was challenged under
the Commerce Clause by a Massachusetts business that hauled
Rhode Island waste to Massachusetts and Maine for disposal.8 5
The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Rhode Island's regulation, which prevented it
from disposing of Rhode Island waste at out-of-state facilities. 86
In Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., the court looked beyond the regulation's facial, nonprotectionist purpose to its "practical effect."87
RISWMC argued that the regulations did not discriminate
because they applied to all waste haulers, regardless of their origin. 8 RISWMC further argued that a significant in-state burden fell on generators of waste who would now be paying more
for disposal services provided at RISWMC's central landfill.8 9
The court acknowledged that the existence of significant instate burdens provided "' "a powerful safeguard" against legislative discrimination,"' but determined that the critical factor
was the economic benefit the regulation conferred on
RISWMC.9 0
flow control regulations, which were implemented to secure the viability of a
waste transfer station, not only affected local waste, but controlled out-of-state
waste imported and processed in the town by a private business. Id at 850.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
those provisions which affected a private waste-processing business, holding
that the town could not use its regulatory powers to reduce local disposal costs
at the expense of interstate commerce. Id. at 854. In Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v.
Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985), the district court
upheld a regulation which precluded exports of waste. Id at 1381. The court
held that the in-state plaintiff failed to allege a protectionist purpose and
therefore dismissed the Commerce Clause action for failure to state a claim.
CE
85. DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 777. DeVito hauled 400 tons per day
of commercial waste to facilities in other states. Id. In 1990 RISWMC reduced
its "tipping fees" for commercial waste from $59 to $49 dollars per ton, hoping
to increase its share of the commercial waste market; it achieved only a shortterm increase in the volume of waste coming to its facilities. Id. The $49 per
ton RISWMC receives from the waste that was being shipped out-of-state significantly increases its revenues. Id. at 781. Municipal solid waste is disposed
of at RISWMC's Central Landfill at a rate set by law ($14 per ton) and
RISWMC has the power to set "tipping fees" for commercial waste at an
amount necessary to fulfill its statutory duties. Id at 781.
86. Id. at 777.
87. See id- at 781-82.
88. Id at 782.
89. Id.
90. Id (quoting J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1988) (in turn quoting Minnesota v. Clo-
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Having determined that the flow control regulations discriminated against interstate commerce, the court applied strict
scrutiny, placing the burden on RISWMC to justify its regulations.9 ' The court analyzed each of the purposes RISWMC gave
for its flow control measure.9 2 The court determined that the
only reasonable justification for the regulation was that it
would facilitate the construction of publicly-owned waste-to-energy facilities in Rhode Island.9 3 The court noted that Rhode
Island's ability to harness commercial waste would help finance
such a project but held that Rhode Island's plan was not the
least burdensome method to fund the waste facility.9 4 The
court analogized the regulations to those challenged in City of
Philadelphiaand held that an absolute ban is the greatest indicator of economic protectionism. 95 In light of the apparent protectionist purpose and effect, the court preliminarily enjoined
RISWMC from enforcing the flow control regulations.9
2.

Striking a Local Application of State Law

Under the Minnesota's Waste Management Act, two southern Minnesota counties in 1989 formed a solid waste management board.97 As part of their plan, Martin and Faribault
Counties established a solid waste composting facility. 98 To
ver Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981))). RISWMC also relied on
the Third Circuit's decision in Filiberto. Id. The DeVito Trucking court distinguished Filiberto, noting that in Filiberto the state did not compete with
out-of-state facilities, but was in fact a customer. DeVito Trucking, 770 F.
Supp. at 782-83. In contrast, RISWMC was using its powers to protect itself
from out-of-state competition. Id See supra note 84 (discussing Filiberto).
91. DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 783.
92. Id Although the court acknowledged that RISWMC's judgments on
"matters that are fairly debatable" warranted considerable deference, it would
not accept RISWMC's assertions to the extent that they were "clearly unsupported or contradicted by the evidence." Id at 783.
93. Id at 785. Although plans for a waste-to-energy facility existed, regulatory approval for the project was not guaranteed. Id
94. Id95. Id at 782. The regulation favored RISWMC as proprietor of a landfill
at the direct expense of out-of-state economic interests. Id
96. Id at 785-86. The First Circuit affirmed the district court for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Tracking,
Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp, 947 F.2d 1004, 1004 (1st
Cir. 1991).
97. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota's
Waste Management Act); see also Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, No.
CIV 3-91-0375, 1992 WL 31418, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 1992).
98. The counties built the eight million dollar facility to accommodate all
of the compostable waste generated within their borders. Waste Systems, 1992
WL 31418, at *1. The composting facility, in conjunction with state mandated
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make the facility financially secure, the counties applied for
and received permission to "designate" the facility as the sole
recipient of all waste generated in Martin and Faribault Counties. 99 Waste Systems Corporation, an Iowa corporation, alleged
that the designation ordinances violated the Commerce Clause
by discriminating against companies that dispose of waste
outside of Minnesota. 00
In Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, a federal district court held that the designation ordinances violated the
Commerce Clause. 1° 1 The court found the designation ordinances to be "strikingly similar" to the flow control regulations
enjoined by the DeVito Trucking court, and applied strict scrutiny.10 2 The decision to designate the facility was motivated in
part by concern for its financial success. The counties' designation plan specifically identified the plaintiff as a competitor
with its facility.'0 3 The court determined that the designation
created a direct economic benefit for the counties' facility by
preventing the flow of waste to the plaintiff's Iowa landfill. 10 4
While recognizing the importance of improved waste management, the court determined that ensuring the financial viability
of the facility was not compelling enough to justify interferencewith interstate commerce.10 5 The court found that less burdensome alternatives for ensuring the financial feasibility of the facility existed. 0 6 The court permanently enjoined the counties
07
from enforcing the designation ordinances.
recycling, is expected to reduce the amount of landfilled county waste by 65%.
Memorandum from Barbara Johnson, Policy Analyst/General Counsel, Association of Minnesota Counties, to the author (Apr. 1, 1992) (Memorandum concerning Prairieland facility, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).

99. Waste Sys., 1992 WL 31418, at *1.
100. Id
101 Id. at *4 (granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
Commerce Clause claim and granting the counties' motions for summary judgment on the other challenges).

102. Id. at *2-3.
103. Id at *4. Approximately two-thirds of the counties' waste is shipped
to Waste Systems's Iowa landfill. Id The counties' designation plans explicitly stated that designation is necessary because they cannot compete with the

plaintiff's landfill. Id at *3.
104. See id

105. Id. at *4.
106. Id. This finding is significant because the designation plans must address alternatives and the county receives permission from the state to designate a facility only if this method is "necessary." See MINN. STAT. § 115A.84
(2), (3)(b) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
107. 1992 WL 31418, at *6. Currently, 20 Minnesota counties either have
designation ordinances in place or are in the process of designating waste as a
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THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION
OF FLOW CONTROL REGULATIONS

Congress recognized that guaranteed waste flow is crucial
to the success of every waste management facility. Many states
have premised their solid waste plans on consistent waste
flow.10 8 However, when waste has entered the stream of commerce, a state's attempt to direct its destination may run afoul
of the Commerce Clause. This Note contends that Congress
should grant states the authority to withdraw waste from the
stream of interstate commerce to encourage the planned disposal of waste.

A. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
BARRIER TO FLOW CONTROL

Regulations which control waste exports in order to ensure
the financial security of in-state waste management programs
raise serious Commerce Clause questions. If states enact export control regulations to promote waste management financing, their environmental goals may be tainted by a form of
protectionism. 10 9 The DeVito Trucking court's invalidation of
RISWMC's flow control regulation reveals that a flow control
program, even when adopted in furtherance of state waste
management plans, violates the proscriptions placed upon state
regulation of interstate commerce. The Waste Systems court's
determination that the designation ordinances enacted pursuant to Minnesota's Waste Management Act were analogous to
RISWMC's regulations further confirms the constitutional inmeans of effectuating plans for integrated waste management. Memorandum
from Barbara Johnson, Policy Analyst/General Counsel, Association of Min-

nesota Counties, to the author (April 1, 1992) (Memorandum concerning information on solid waste management and designation in Minnesota, on file with
the Minnesota Law Review). Designation has been used in connection with
construction of refuse-derived fuel facilities, municipal solid-waste incinerators, and composting facilities. Id The designation ordinance enacted by Martin and Faribault Counties was the first to be challenged under the Commerce
Clause. The district court decision is already having significant repercussions
within the state. Four counties in southeastern Minnesota are reassessing
their plans to construct a composting facility, trying to determine whether the
project will be feasible without designation. Id Additionally, Winona County,
whose waste is currently hauled to landfills as far away as the Chicago, put its
plans for a composting facility on hold. The county planned to use designation
ordinances to gain control over the waste flowing out of the state, but it fears
Commerce Clause litigation. See Julie Forster, Down in the Dump, WINONA
DAILY NEWS, March 18, 1992, at 1.
108. See supra note 46 (listing examples of such states).
109. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

"1992]

WASTE MANAGEMENT

1243

firmity of flow controls." 0
The Devito Trucking and Waste Systems courts perceived
that the primary goal of the flow control measures was to confer a direct economic benefit on in-state interests by reserving
for them an item in interstate commerce."' This finding is inconsistent with the view that waste collection and disposal are
entirely a "local concern." Rather, it reveals that these traditionally local services have not retained a wholly local character."2 Because waste increasingly crosses state lines, use of the
once-traditional police power to control waste disposal is perceived by courts to violate a long standing precedent in Commerce Clause analysis and therefore to fall outside of the
"residuum of power in the state to make laws governing mat' 3
ters of local concern. ""
These courts were justifiably concerned about the adverse
affects of protectionist state restrictions on interstate waste disposal.114 State structured plans, however, avoid many of the
evils usually associated with protectionist regulations." 5 It is
110. See Waste Sys., 1992 WL 31418, at *3. However, an export ban enacted
by Delaware's Solid Waste Authority survived a Commerce Clause attack.
Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1371
(D. Del. 1985). The court's decision to uphold Delaware's regulation rested
primarily on the fact that the in-state plaintiff did not mount a successful challenge to the findings contained in Delaware's solid waste management legislation. Id. at 1381. The plaintiff's misunderstanding of the burden of proof was
critical to the court's analysis under the Bruce Church balancing test. Id.; see
Meltz, supra note 6, at 10,389 (questioning the application of the lenient balancing test to the waste export ban because the regulation was not facially
neutral nor was its impact on interstate commerce incidental); cf.Waste Systems, 1992 WL 31418, at *3 (applying strict scrutiny); Stephen D. DeVito, Jr.
Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp.
775, 783 (D.R.I.) (same), qff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
111. See Waste Systems, 1992 WL 31418, at *3; DeVito Trucking, 770 F.
Supp. at 782.
112. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the long-distance
hauling of waste).
113. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1976) (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)). Congress, however, viewed waste management as a matter of local concern and
thus did not treat it as an area requiring uniform national regulation. H.R.
REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6242
(describing flexibility of federal guidelines); FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra
note 3, at 304-08 (discussing diversity in state planning).
114. See Regan, supra note 67, at 1092 (arguing that rooting out protectionist intent should be the goal of Commerce Clause analysis).
115. See DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 779 (noting that businesses have
a strong interest in an open waste-disposal market). However, economic efficiency and a free national market, are important, goals, but some commentators argue that they are not driving forces behind the Constitution. See
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unlikely that other states will enact retaliatory policies in response to flow controls which prevent waste from crossing into
landfills or other facilities located within their borders.11 6 The
EPA has long intended that waste generators bear the cost for
improved waste management; flow controls achieve this
result.117
The courts' analyses also ignore a more important consideration: states cannot achieve coherent waste management without financing waste disposal facilities. Financing is often
achieved by waste export bans needed to guarantee consistent
waste volume. For example, RISWMC faced a waste "migration" problem and needed the income from fees on commercial
waste in order to prevent a deficit that would hamper its ability
to carry out its statutory- responsibilities. 188 By enacting flow
control regulations, RISWMC captured the commercial waste
generated within Rhode Igland's borders. The ability to capture
waste significantly increasdd RISWMC's revenues and provided
Farber, supra note 66, at 402 (discounting free trade as a substantive constitutional value in itself, in light of congressional power to authorize federal or
state barriers to trade); Regan, supra note 67, at 1119 (arguing that the framers of the Constitution were not efficiency oriented, and that "protectionism is
inefficient because it diverts business away from presumptively low-cost producers without any colorablejustificationin terms offederally cognizable benefit) (emphasis added). These regulations also impose significant in-state
burdens, which may not protect them from scrutiny but should factor into the
analysis. See Farber, supra note 66, at 404-05.
116. In addressing the retention of natural resources, the Court concluded
that a "singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the
Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals. And why may not the
products of the field be brought within the principle? Thus enlarged, or without that enlargement, its influence on interstate commerce need not be
pointed out." West v. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). Waste is
neither a natural resource nor in short supply. Therefore, the cumulative effect of states intentionally keeping waste, particularly in furtherance of effective waste management, will only be positive. Importing states generally try
to encourage other states to keep their own waste by enacting waste-import
taxes or bans. See Casey Bukro, Ohio FightingGarbageRuling That Leaves It
Holding the Bag, CHI. TRm., July 9, 1989, at 21.
117. See AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 34.
118. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.R.I.), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d
1004 (1st Cir. 1991). The court focused on the relationship between the regulations and RISWMC's need for revenues. Id RISWMC recognized this relationship, admitting that it had failed to attract commercial waste generators to
use its facilities. Id Thus, RISWMC could enforce flow controls or fail to satisfy its duty to implement modern, environmentally acceptable waste disposal
and resource recovery facilities. Brief for Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp. at 11, Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991) (No. 91-1683).
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investment security for financers of a waste-to-energy facility.119 The DeVito Trucking court affirmed the long-standing
principle of preserving a free national marketplace by recognizing that businesses have an interest in being able to dispose of
their waste in an interstate market, rather than one manipulated by state regulations. 2 0 The court, however, ignored significant realities in contemporary waste management.
The need to evade the Commerce Clause has also strongly
influenced the content of state solid waste legislation. 121 The
threat of a Commerce Clause challenge to regulatory efforts is
a significant deterrent to aggressive state solid waste management. While awareness of the effects of state regulations on interstate commerce is important, the Commerce Clause should
not present an insurmountable hurdle for waste management
planning. Flow control regulations are a means of financing
waste facilities and programs. However, the DeVito Trucking
and Waste Systems courts held that they violate the Commerce
Clause precisely because of this economic reality.2 2 Whether a
given state's current solid waste management plan is the least
burdensome means of achieving its goals should not be the decisive factor in flow control litigation. Rather, the concern
should be whether a state's actions promote state and federal
119. RISWMC bonds are guaranteed through the revenues generated by
tipping fees. Thus, loss of commercial waste significantly reduces the level of
assurance provided to prospective bondholders. DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp.
at 785. RISWMC explicitly linked financing of a waste-to-energy facility with
income generated from "tipping fees" charged for commercial waste, thus
combining a standard government obligation with the economics of modernday waste disposal techniques. This combination of the legitimate exercise of
police powers and economic protectionism was challenged in Central Iowa Refuse Sys. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 426 (1983)
(plaintiff did not challenge the power of municipalities to regulate solid waste
disposal for "any public health or welfare reason," but did challenge the extension of this power to guarantee financial success of a facility), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
120. DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 779.
121. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that states are trying
to regulate waste imports but avoid Commerce Clause problems).
122. The DeVito Trucking and Waste Systems courts focused on the fact
that flow control was affecting interstate commerce. Waste Systems Corp. v.
County of Martin, CIV. 3-91-0375, 1992 WL 31418, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 14,
1992); DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 779. However, wholly intrastate flow
control regulations, enacted in conjunction with state solid waste management
plans, are routinely upheld. See, e.g., A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Dep't, 449 A.2d 516 (N.J. 1982); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tennessee v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, No. 01-A019104CH00156, 1991 WL 219383 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1991) (upholding flow
controls in conjunction with the financing of a facility).
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policies. Unless Congress opts to permit state export bans,
however, state waste management efforts will forever be at the
mercy of the dormant Commerce Clause.
B.

FLow

CONTROL IS CONSISTENT wiTH

RCRA

State or local government control over waste collection and
disposal is consistent with RCRA's purposes. Both the legislative history and the legislation itself reveal that Congress was
concerned with maintaining a consistent waste flow. For that
reason, Congress conditioned federal assistance upon the removal of state or local barriers to long-term contracts for securing volumes of waste and provided panels to advise states on
3
effective planning methods.2
Congress intended RCRA to encourage and facilitate effective planning, but not to interfere with state autonomy. Requiring states to remove all barriers to the formation of longterm contracts was the only provision that necessitated changes
in existing state and local laws. The legislative history reveals
that Congress explicitly intended this intrusion to be narrow,
applying only to state or local laws that would interfere with
guaranteeing long term supplies of waste to a resource recovery
facility. 2A4 Significantly, the legislative history also reveals that
Congress did not intend to "affect state planning which may require all discarded materials to be transported to a particular
location."'' 2 When RCRA was enacted, Congress may have assumed that flow control regulations were a legitimate exercise
of state police power. Recent litigation, however, casts doubt
on that assumption's validity.
Consistently, Congress and the EPA have recognized municipal solid waste disposal as a matter best left to state and local governments. RCRA provided states flexibility in achieving
the goals established by Congress. These policies are affirmed
in the EPA's Agenda for Action and in current congressional
efforts to amend RCRA. 126 RCRA's purpose is to facilitate the
development of effective state plans and facilities, not to derail
123.
124.

42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5) (1988).
H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 34, reprinted in

1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6272.
125. Id.
126. See AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 9 (describing the federal
government's leadership role, while leaving primary responsibility with state

and local government); see also 137 CONG. REC. H10,990 (daily ed. Nov. 22,
1991) (statement of Rep. Swift) (stating that H.R. 3865 will "provide a much-

needed Federal leadership role in this effort, building on the expertise and re-
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state, regional, or local government activities aimed toward
7
achieving those ends.12
C. WHY FLOw CONTROL WORKS
With landfill capacity disappearing nationwide, waste disposal increasingly has national implications. 2 8 Construction of
new, environmentally sound waste disposal facilities may be inhibited in some places because of "waste flight." Instead of creating local capacity, waste is hauled to places that have
capacity. 2 9 While shipping waste to another state is the easiest
method of eliminating a serious problem, it inevitably intrudes
upon other states' planning efforts. 30 In addition, it is a shortterm option that creates significant hurdles for long-term, local
3
solutions.' '
Increasingly, new public waste disposal facilities are pub32
licly owned and financed through the sale of revenue bonds.'
sponsibilities of State and local governments in solid waste management, without supplanting their traditional authorities in this area").
127. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 63, reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6302.
128.

Congress recognized that interstate and intermunicipal commerce in

waste was causing problems and that hazardous waste is more likely to be the
subject of interstate commerce. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 10, at 10,
reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6247. Today, however, interstate commerce
in hazardous waste is substantially regulated, and nonhazardous waste has become the more controversial issue.
129.

AGENDA FOR AcTIoN, supra note 1, at 14. Assuming responsibility for

waste requires the ability to exercise flow control. If a state, planning to build
and finance expensive facilities, finds that "waste flight" is draining a significant portion of the local waste volume, planning efforts will fail. See id.; see
also FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 275 (stating that "waste will
flow in the direction of lower costs"); Fagin, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that
increased tipping fees in New York make out-of-state disposal cheaper for private haulers of commercial waste).
130. Although 40 C.F.R. § 256.42(h) (1991) says that states should "provide
for substate cooperation and policies for free and unrestricted movement of
solid and hazardous waste across State and local boundaries," the portions of
RCRA that provided for interstate regions were never enforced. FACING
AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 14. Thus, states plan for their own waste
but find imported waste absorbing in-state capacity. See Johnson, supra note
6, at 136-37 (describing Pennsylvania's effort to preserve landfill space by increasing recycling, only to find imported waste obviating any benefits).
131. See AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 14; Vasuki, supra note 8, at
20 (noting that the short-term solution of shipping waste "can prove to be the
downfall of local waste management").
132. See United States v. O'Rourke, 943 F.2d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 1991). However, public ownership does not preclude extensive private involvement. See
FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 3, at 224 (discussing the trend toward
public ownership of waste-to-energy facilities with private involvement);
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Flow control regulations achieve the same investment security
that Congress intended to provide through long-term contracts.
However, flow controls can manage waste not otherwise controlled by local or state government. If the option to ship waste
elsewhere remains, it will be difficult or impossible to build expensive facilities which require guaranteed volumes of waste in
order to be economically viable. Flow control regulations make
the development of long-term in-state solutions more feasible
by precluding waste-flight. Thus, when enacted as part of a
comprehensive state plan, flow controls promote both local and
national interests.
Congress is well aware of the need to address the problems
posed by the interstate shipments of waste and has focused on
the issue during the current reauthorization process. Congress
has concentrated on the plight of states currently "bear[ing] the
1
burden of managing another State's municipal solid waste."
In addition to requiring state planning and amending the minimum requirements for state plans, proposals currently before
Congress would condition state authority to control waste im1
ports upon EPA approval of state waste management plans. 3
States should have some means of controlling waste imports. Linking this authority with an approved plan would allow the EPA to ensure that each state is meeting its own waste
management obligations consistently with federal policies.
However, Congress should address the problems states such as
Rhode Island and Minnesota face in trying to create in-state
waste disposal capacity.
Congress should amend RCRA to authorize states to retain
the waste generated within their borders. This authority
should be linked to EPA approval. Such a provision would formally recognize the economic connection between the planning
and the implementation of integrated waste management, and
would end any doubt about the constitutional viability of state
waste plans.
States should be able to submit plans to the EPA which include provisions enabling the responsible planning authorities
to control waste flow. Congress charged the EPA with approvVasuki, supra note 8, at 24 (describing how public ownership can include private businesses). Regardless of ownership, in enacting RCRA, Congress was
very concerned with guaranteed flows of waste. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra
note 10, at 34, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6272.
133. 174 CONG. REC. H10,991 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep.

Swift).
134. Id.
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ing plans and the agency has the expertise to determine which
types of controls will be effective.135 States should have the
ability to use waste generated within their borders to promote
integrated waste management, so long as their regulations remain consistent with federal waste management goals. Enabling states to enact flow control measures free of Commerce
Clause challenges will have the positive effect of allowing
states to plan for the waste generated within their borders and
to rely on that waste to support the facilities intended to augment in-state capacity.
This proposal alone will not solve the nation's many solid
waste disposal problems. Further source reduction and recycling are essential elements of a real solution to the nation's
solid waste disposal crisis. However, as states begin to take aggressive action to meet their disposal needs, Commerce Clause
challenges are likely to increase. Congress can facilitate productive planning by removing the Commerce Clause barrier to
flow control regulations.
CONCLUSION
The First Law of Garbage may be changing. 136 Some states
are trying to take responsibility for their own waste. Building
the facilities necessary to achieve federal goals is an expensive
undertaking. Giving states the ability to enact flow control regulations would allow them to regain control over those portions
of the waste stream that are leaving the state, thereby putting
that waste to work. However, the Commerce Clause effectively
bars these efforts. Congress must remove this barrier and provide states with an incentive to undertake effective-but ex135. See Farber, supra note 66, at 407-08 (discussing the grant of power to
agencies to approve policies that interfere with interstate commerce). Currently, EPA approval of a state plan does not guarantee Commerce Clause immunity, even for regulations that apply to hazardous and nonhazardous
wastes. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of
Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1991); Meltz, supra note 6, at
10,393. Prior to the Court's City of Philadelphiadecision, Johnston, supra
note 39, argued that preemption should not be found unless the Administrator
of the EPA determines that a state statute which inhibits interstate commerce
in waste interferes with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. I&
(footnotes omitted). While the Court did not find that RCRA preempted an
import ban, it held that RCRA did not grant states the power to regulate commerce, even if the regulations were consistent with RCRA. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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pensive-projects by allowing them to harness local waste
resources. As a result, less wastes will flow to states that do
not want to serve as "dumping grounds."

